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Asia Crisis Postmortem: 
Where Did the Money Go 
and Did the United States 
Benefit? 
he recent currency crises in Asia have raised important 
questions about the sensitivity of industrialized-country 
economies to financial turmoil in emerging markets. In late 
1997 and in 1998, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
and Thailand experienced net capital outflows of more than 
$80 billion, plunging them from “growth-miracle” status into 
their worst recessions in decades. GDP growth rates in Korea 
and Malaysia in 1998 were -5.8 percent and -7.5 percent, 
respectively, and in Indonesia and Thailand the rates were 
worse than -10 percent. By comparison, GDP growth in the 
United States was a healthy 4.3 percent that year.
These contrasting experiences are puzzling at first glance, 
because it was widely believed that the downturn in Asia would 
have a negative effect on the U.S. economy.1 Recessions in the 
crisis countries, according to this logic, in conjunction with 
sharply depreciated currencies, would reduce the countries’ 
demand for U.S. exports.  In addition, the depreciated 
currencies would lead to a surge in U.S. imports from these 
countries.  Hence, through these international trade channels, 
the Asia crisis was expected to contribute negatively to U.S. 
growth. The U.S. net export deficit did, in fact, increase, 
contributing -1.2 percentage points to U.S. GDP growth in 
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• In the crisis years of 1997-98, the hardest-hit 
Asian countries experienced net capital 
outflows of more than $80 billion.
• Almost all of the outflows originated as 
banking flows. The majority went first to 
offshore center banks and then to banks 
in Europe. 
• Much of the capital eventually reached 
the United States, but in the form of foreign 
direct investment or portfolio investment 
rather than banking flows.
• An equilibrium analysis of supply- and 
demand-side channels suggests that the 
overall effect of the crisis on U.S. GDP 
was positive but small.
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1998.  However, the increase in the deficit was more than offset 
by increased spending on consumer goods and producers’ 
durable equipment, so that employment and production rose. 
Quarter by quarter, U.S. GDP growth in 1998 consistently 
exceeded projections.
In our view, this apparently surprising immunity of the U.S. 
economy to the Asia crisis reflects the fact that the original way 
of thinking about the crisis was flawed. First, it focused only on 
demand-side channels and ignored the supply side. Second, the 
depreciation of the Asian currencies against the dollar and the 
recessions in the crisis countries represented endogenous 
responses to a large and sharp reallocation of capital out of the 
Asia crisis region. From the point of view of the United States, 
this reallocation of capital is the appropriate starting point—
rather than the depreciations and recessions—for considering 
the implications of the crisis.
What, then, precipitated the large and sharp reallocation of 
capital out of Asia? We believe that increased expectations of 
private sector bankruptcies and currency depreciations are 
likely forces. These expectations could have been grounded in 
fundamental information about conditions in the private 
sector. They could also have been influenced by nonfunda-
mental forces such as rational or irrational herding behavior. 
As we indicate below, it is immaterial to our framework 
whether the change in expectations was driven by funda-
mentals or nonfundamentals. In either case, there was a large 
decline in demand for Asian assets. A large capital outflow 
occurred, and all the macroeconomic consequences for the 
United States ensued from this outflow.
The reallocation of capital toward the United States 
generated the above-mentioned negative trade effects on the 
country’s GDP. But the capital inflows also created a positive 
effect by financing a rise in U.S. spending, directly through 
increased financing for liquidity-constrained firms and 
consumers as well as indirectly through a drop in interest rates. 
The capital inflows also led to an appreciating dollar, which 
made imported inputs cheaper. These cheaper inputs 
generated a positive effect on GDP similar to that of a positive 
productivity shock.2
As the crisis proceeded and U.S. growth remained strong, 
a new scenario along the lines sketched above—with capital 
inflows to the United States as the centerpiece—became 
increasingly popular.3 Yet surprisingly little quantitative 
research has examined this scenario. This article aims to at least 
partially fill that gap. Specifically, we begin by attempting to 
document the trail of capital out of Asia and into the United 
States.4 We then discuss and quantify the implications for 
short-run U.S. GDP growth of the direct and indirect 
reallocation of capital from Asia to the United States. Our 
quantification employs an “equilibrium” approach in which 
both supply- and demand-side channels are calculated.
It is not difficult to document the “beginning” and the 
“end” of the money trail insofar as it involves the Asian 
countries and the United States. Capital outflows from 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand 
from the start of the crisis in 1997:2 to the end of 1998 
amounted to more than $80 billion. The U.S. current account 
deficit in 1998 was $221 billion, which represented an increase 
of $77 billion from 1997, financed by a rise in capital inflows.
It is difficult, however, to document the precise money trail 
from these Asian countries to the United States. In particular, 
it is hard to ascertain in exactly what form (banking, portfolio, 
or direct investment flows) and from exactly which countries 
the funds entered. We assume that the initial “round” of 
bilateral international money flows arises directly from the 
crisis, but subsequent rounds of flows could be due to other 
causes. Also, the net errors and omissions component of the 
U.S. balance of payments is typically large and, more 
importantly, it tends to spike during crises. At times, the 
change in errors and omissions is often large enough to cancel 
out even the largest change in reported capital flows.
Nevertheless, using Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) data and data drawn from the U.S. Treasury Depart-
ment’s Treasury International Capital (TIC) system, we can 
follow the trail to a certain extent. Accordingly, we find that 
banking flows were the major source of the outflows, and that 
these outflows were dispersed all over the world, to such places 
as Japan, Europe, the United States, and to offshore banking 
centers. The majority of the flows went to the offshore centers. 
Our findings also suggest that most of the offshore centers 
funneled their funds to European banks. Although the trail 
runs cold from there, we conclude that banks clearly played an 
important role at the beginning of the reallocation process and 
that the money clearly came to the United States in a 
roundabout fashion.
To analyze the impact of the crisis on short-run U.S. GDP 
growth, we consider three channels. The first is the trade 
The Asia crisis was expected to contribute 
negatively to U.S. growth. The U.S. net 
export deficit did, in fact, increase. . . . 
However, the increase in the deficit was 
more than offset by increased spending 
on consumer goods and producers’ 
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Chart 1
Financial Account of the Asia-4 Countries
Billions of U.S. dollars
Source: See Appendix 1.
Note: The financial account is net capital inflows—that is, the net 
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Chart 2
Breakdown of the Asia-4 Countries’ 
Financial Account 
Billions of U.S. dollars






channel, which has a negative impact on growth. The second is 
a domestic demand channel, in which capital inflows finance 
an increase in domestic demand. The counterpart to the two 
demand channels is our third channel: the supply channel. The 
appreciation of the dollar against the Asian currencies leads to 
a decrease in prices of imported inputs. We provide evidence 
consistent with each of these channels and quantify their 
impact on U.S. GDP growth. We find that the net effect of 
the Asia crisis on U.S. growth was small but positive—
+0.2 percentage point—confirming the newer wisdom.
The Outflow of Capital from 
the Asia Crisis Countries
The sharp and sudden net capital outflow from the “Asia-4” 
crisis countries of Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, and 
Thailand is evident in Chart 1.5 These countries experienced 
positive net capital inflows throughout the 1990s. Then, in 
1997:3, a sharp outflow began. In the six quarters from 1997:3 
through 1998:4, the countries experienced a net outflow of 
$77.9 billion. By contrast, in the six quarters prior to the crisis, 
the Asia-4 countries experienced a cumulative net inflow of 
$86.8 billion. Even today, three years after the beginning of the 
crisis, these countries continue to experience net capital 
outflows.
If we divide the financial account (we use this term and 
capital account interchangeably) into portfolio flows, foreign 
direct investment (FDI) flows, and “other” flows, we see that 
the bulk of outflows since the onset of the crisis consisted of 
other flows (Chart 2).6 Indeed, other flows accounted for more 
than 100 percent of the total net outflows, with a cumulative 
outflow of $84.9 billion from 1997:3 through 1998:4. During 
this period, $46.2 billion—equivalent to 59.3 percent of the 
total outflows—represented Asia-4 bank flows.
Chart 3 suggests that the counterparties to the capital flows 
involving the Asia-4 countries were almost surely BIS reporting 
banks, a group that includes banks from most of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
countries as well as several offshore centers in the Caribbean, 
Hong Kong, and elsewhere.7 The chart shows exchange-rate-
adjusted net lending flows from the BIS reporting banks to the 
Asia-4. The increase in net lending in the years preceding the 
crisis, as well as the sharp reduction in net lending by these 
banks after 1997:2, closely mirrors the overall capital inflows 
and outflows from the Asia-4 depicted in Charts 1 and 2.8 The 
cumulative net lending flows from 1997:3 through 1998:4 
equal a net outflow of $105.3 billion. This amount is equal to 
about one-third of the total stock of claims against these 
countries in 1997:2. Taken together, Charts 2 and 3 suggest that 
most of the capital outflows involved banks on both sides—
Asia-4 banks on the one hand and BIS reporting country banks 
on the other hand.
Which countries were the largest sources of the reduction in 
net bank lending to the Asia-4? There are two ways to address 
this question. One way views countries as locations, the other 
views them as representing nationalities. For example, a Swiss 
bank subsidiary operating in the United States would count as 
a U.S. bank based on geography and a Swiss bank based on 
nationality. The two ways are complementary because the 
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Chart 3
BIS Reporting Banks’ Net Lending 
to the Asia-4 Countries
Billions of U.S. dollars
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Chart 4
Net Bank Lending to the Asia-4 Countries 
by Location of BIS Reporting Bank
Billions of U.S. dollars
Source: See Appendix 1.
Note: IBFs are international banking facilities.
Eve of crisis
Japan
United States and IBFs
Offshore
Europe-7
Net Lending of BIS Country Banks: 
June 1997 to December 1998
Source: Bank for International Settlements.
Notes: The flows out of the Asia-4 correspond to an increase in net
liabilities vis-à-vis the Asia-4 of BIS reporting banks in the offshore
countries, the United States, the Europe-7, and Japan. The flows of the
offshore countries vis-à-vis the United States, the Europe-7, and 
Japan correspond to net lending by banks in the offshore countries 















data on capital flows, while the nationality approach helps 
control for the fact that many cross-border banking flows 
involve borrowing and lending by banks with their subsidiaries 
in other countries. This is especially true for banks that have 
branches or subsidiaries in offshore centers.
We begin by examining the geographic approach (Chart 4). 
Here, net bank lending flows to the Asia-4 are reported by 
location of the BIS reporting bank. The chart focuses on four 
regions: Japan, the “Europe-7” countries, the United States and 
its international banking facilities (IBFs), and the offshore 
centers. Europe-7 comprises France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 
Although banks in all four regions reduced their net lending to 
the Asia-4, the reductions by banks in Japan, the Europe-7, and 
the United States typically were on the order of several billion 
dollars per quarter. The chart clearly shows that the majority of 
outflows from the Asia-4 was accounted for by the offshore 
centers: $54.3 billion of the total net outflow of $105.3 billion.
Because the economies of the offshore centers are relatively 
small, we presume that most of their inflows must generate 
corresponding outflows. To a large extent, one can therefore 
view these centers as “pass-through stations.” 9 The exhibit 
depicts this in the form of a flow process. It presents net 
cumulative bank lending of BIS reporting countries over the 
1997:3-1998:4 period. Banks in offshore centers experienced 
$112 billion in net inflows from the Asia-4 and Japan between 
June 1997 and December 1998. Most of this money went to 
banks in the Europe-7, which experienced a $121.1 billion net 
inflow from the offshore centers.
What is also striking is the small amount of banking inflows 
to the United States originating directly from the Asia-4 or 
mediated through the offshore centers. The funds associated 
with the Asia-4 capital outflow could have reached the U.S. 
banks via more indirect channels, such as through Europe or 
even from Japan by way of the offshore centers and Europe. 
Once the flows become so indirect, however, it is difficult to 
follow the original source of the funds. This phenomenon FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2000 55
Chart 5
Source of BIS Reporting Banks’ Claims 
on the Asia-4 Countries
Billions of U.S. dollars
Source: See Appendix 1.
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United States and IBFs
already is apparent in the exhibit. More funds entered the 
offshore centers from Japan than from the Asia-4, so we cannot 
conclude that the funds exiting the offshore centers are directly 
connected to the Asia-4 outflows. This exiting offshore money 
could also be the result of net capital outflows from Japan 
connected to its own economic downturn.
Of the $105.3 billion reduction in lending, $98.5 billion 
represented declines in claims on the Asia-4 (Table 1, top row). 
Hence, we find that most of the adjustment is on the claims 
side. We also find that, even though a not-insignificant share of 
the BIS bank loans was denominated in domestic currencies, 
the exchange-rate-adjusted flows are almost identical to the 
change in the stock of claims less liabilities (Table 1, second 
row). The reduction in stocks was $106.3 billion and the 
reduction in claims was $99.4 billion. These two findings are 
useful, because they suggest that comparisons can be made 
between the geographic-based and nationality-based data. The 
nationality-based data are available only for claims and not 
liabilities, and they are available only for stocks of claims rather 
than for exchange-rate-adjusted flows.
A summary of bank lending to the Asia-4 by nationality can 
be found in the bottom panel of Table 1. Time series of both the 
geographic and nationality data are presented in Chart 5 as 
well. First, note that the total reduction in assets based on the 
nationality data ($79.7 billion) is $19.7 billion less than that 
based on the geographic breakdown. The reason is that the 
nationality data exclude banks in the offshore centers with 
nationalities other than those of the non-offshore BIS 
countries. Examples are banks of Hong Kong or Saudi Arabian 
nationality operating in Hong Kong. Of the $79.7 billion 
reduction in assets that can be assigned to nationalities, only 
$47.4 billion involves the United States, the “Europe-6” 
countries (the Europe-7 excluding Switzerland), and Japan. 
Banks whose nationalities are the same as that of one of the 
Table 1
Change in Assets and Liabilities of BIS Reporting 
Banks vis-à-vis the Asia-4 Countries: 
June 1997 to December 1998
Assets Liabilities Net Claims
Geographic Breakdown
Cumulative exchange- 
   rate-adjusted flows  -98.5 6.8 -105.3
Change in stocks
All BIS countries -99.4 6.9 -106.3
Offshore countries -51.3 2.8 -54.1
United States -14.9 2.1 -17.1
Europe-7 -11.4 2.6 -14.0
Japan -18.4 -0.8 -17.6
Nationality Breakdown
Change in stocks
All nationalities -79.7 ——




   BIS nationalities -7.0 ——
   Other nationalities -25.3 ——
Source: Bank for International Settlements.
Notes: The geographic breakdown refers to all banks located in Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) reporting countries. The nationality 
breakdown refers to all banks located in non-offshore BIS reporting 
countries, plus the foreign affiliates of these banks if they have the 
nationality of one of the non-offshore BIS reporting countries. This 
means that banks in offshore countries with nationalities other than those 
of the non-offshore BIS countries are not included in the nationality 
breakdown, even though they are included in the geographic breakdown. 
This accounts for the small discrepancy between the totals based on the 
geographic and nationality breakdowns. The nationality data are available 
only for claims. Europe-7 includes France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Europe-6 
excludes Switzerland. Banks of Swiss nationality in Switzerland are 
included in the total for the nationality breakdown, but are not included 
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Chart 6
Asia-4 Current Account versus
the Financial Account
Source: See Appendix 1.
Note: The financial account is net capital inflows—that is, the net
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Chart 7
Current Accounts
Source: See Appendix 1.
Eve of crisis
smaller non-offshore BIS countries account for an additional 
$7 billion.10 This leaves $25.3 billion that is accounted for by 
banks of other nationalities operating in the BIS countries, 
such as Thai and Korean banks in the United States. Therefore, 
a total of $45 billion in outflows from the Asia-4 to banks 
located in BIS countries ($19.7 billion plus $25.3 billion) 
involves nationalities other than those of the non-offshore BIS 
countries. This amount is almost half of the total outflows from 
the Asia-4. Only $7.6 billion is associated with banks of U.S. 
nationality.
We note parenthetically that the Asia-4 current account was 
initially buffered against the large capital outflows by 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) credit and a rundown of 
reserves (Chart 6). It is worthwhile to recall that from a 
balance-of-payments perspective, a rundown of central bank 
foreign exchange reserves is a net official capital inflow, which 
is about half of the rise in reserves in Chart 6. The other half is 
associated with the increase in IMF credit. The chart shows that 
the full current account adjustment did not take place until 
1998:1.
To summarize, banks played a large role in the immediate 
outflows from Asia, most of which went to offshore center 
banks. These banks, in turn, played a large role in funneling the 
outflows to banks in Europe. Once the money reached Europe, 
it became part of a vast pool of capital, rendering the trail 
difficult to follow from there. Consequently, we now focus on 
how the capital flows entered the United States.
Capital Flows to the United States 
in the Wake of the Crisis
Turning our attention from Asia-4 outflows to U.S. inflows, we 
examine the seasonally adjusted quarterly current account 
balances of Japan, the Europe-7, the Asia-4, and the United 
States (Chart 7). Here we see that the United States experienced 
a large, $31.3 billion deterioration of its quarterly current 
account from 1997:2 to 1998:4. By comparison, the Asia-4 
current account improved by $19.7 billion during this period. 
If we include Malaysia, the improvement was $26 billion. Japan 
also experienced an improvement in its current account.
The chart gives the impression that most, if not all, of the 
capital outflows from Asia went to the United States. However, 
this impression is not completely warranted. Since 1991, the 
U.S. current account has been trending downward, while the 
Europe-7 current account has been trending upward. Because 
U.S. GDP growth rates throughout this period have been 
higher than European growth rates, it is entirely possible that 
these trends would have continued in the absence of the crisis. 
Accordingly, we fit a simple linear time trend to the two current 
accounts using data from 1990:1 to 1997:2. Extrapolating 
forward, we find that the actual Europe-7 current account 
decreased by $22 billion relative to trend between 1997:2 and 
Banks played a large role in the immediate 
outflows from Asia, most of which went to 
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Chart 8
Net Lending by the United States
to the Asia-4 Countries







Net Lending by U.S. Banks
Billions of U.S. dollars
Source: See Appendix 1.
Eve of crisis
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1998:4. The actual U.S. current account decreased by 
$25 billion relative to trend during this period. Hence, relative 
to trend, both regions’ current accounts deteriorated by similar 
magnitudes. This evidence, coupled with the evidence 
presented earlier, suggests that both the United States and 
Europe experienced substantial capital inflows connected to 
the Asia crisis.11
We also showed earlier that very little of the Asia crisis 
capital flows to the United States took the form of direct flows 
from the Asia-4 to the United States. This point is illustrated in 
Chart 8. U.S. banks’ net lending to the Asia-4 fell by about 
$10 billion from 1997:2 to 1997:4, but the reduction in net 
lending was relatively short-lived, as negative net lending was 
less than $2 billion from 1998:1 onward. By comparison, total 
net U.S. capital inflows averaged $68 billion per quarter 
between 1997:3 and 1998:4. The chart also depicts net portfolio 
flows during this period. These flows include both long-term 
portfolio flows and changes in the holdings of U.S. Treasury 
bills by the Asian countries. Interestingly, the portfolio flows 
move in the opposite direction of the bank flows. The net 
portfolio outflow from the United States to the Asia-4 in the 
midst of the crisis, at the end of 1997, is likely the result of the 
sale of Treasury securities by central banks in the Asian 
countries.
Our evidence, then, indicates that there were large capital 
flows to the United States (and Europe) as a result of the Asia 
crisis, but it also shows that the flows reached the United States 
in a roundabout fashion, going through several countries 
before eventually winding up there. To the extent that these 
flows were intermediated through banks, we would expect to 
see a surge in net flows to U.S. banks (or, equivalently, a 
decrease in net external lending by U.S. banks). As we see from 
the top panel of Chart 9, this was not the case. Although inflows 
to the United States increased by about $40 billion in 1997:4, 
there was an equally large outflow in 1998:1. The cumulative 
net inflow over the entire 1997:3-1998:4 period was only 
$8.4 billion. The bottom panel of the chart breaks down net 
lending by region (Europe-7, offshore, and Japan). Although 
there was an increase in net flows from Japan to U.S. banks 
from the beginning of the crisis, there was also a similarly large 
increase in net flows from U.S. banks to Europe.
Hence, while BIS banks accounted for virtually all of the net 
outflows from Asia, we also know that the net capital flows into 
the United States were not intermediated through U.S. banks. 
Other intermediation channels existed. European banks, for 
example, could have shifted lending from Asia to local 
institutions, which then could have used the money for foreign 
direct investment or portfolio investment in the United States. 
Indeed, cumulative net inflows to the United States from 
1997:3 through 1998:4 associated with FDI and portfolio 
investment totaled $326.9 billion. Of course, given the large 
U.S. current account deficits, much of these flows would have 
occurred anyway.
A key difficulty with using the U.S. balance-of-payments 
data is that errors and omissions (the statistical discrepancy) 
were very large and volatile after the crisis. Between 1997:2 and 
1998:4, cumulative errors and omissions were -$92.6 billion, 
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Chart 10
U.S. Balance of Payments
Source: See Appendix 1.
Note: The financial account is net capital inflows—that is, the net
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Euro/U.S. dollar
Chart 11
Euro/U.S. Dollar and Yen/U.S. Dollar
Real Exchange Rates














what was actually reported during this period.12 Also, from 
1997 to 1998, the current account deficit increased by 
$76.7 billion, but reported capital inflows decreased by 
$70.8 billion. Put differently, net errors and omissions rose by 
$152.7 billion between 1997 and 1998; this suggests that actual 
capital inflows rose by $152.7 billion more than reported.
Changes in net errors and omissions were also very 
important in many of the key quarters (Chart 10). For example, 
in 1997:4, the United States experienced a net capital inflow of 
$114 billion, which represented an increase of about $40 billion 
from the previous quarter. The current account deficit was 
$41 billion, representing a $4 billion decrease from the 1997:3 
deficit. Errors and omissions, then, were -$73 billion, 
representing a change of -$44 billion relative to the previous 
quarter. This suggests that the increase in U.S. capital inflows in 
1997:4 might not have occurred. Similarly, the data show a 
sharp drop in capital inflows in 1998:1, but this drop is again 
offset by a movement in errors and omissions in the opposite 
direction. There are several other episodes—for example, 
during the Mexican crisis in 1994 and 1995—in which changes 
in errors and omissions were the opposite of changes in the 
financial account. It is therefore difficult to infer much from 
the U.S. capital flows data.
Finally, we consider the possibility that the United States 
functioned as a “safe haven” during this period. In this 
scenario, foreign investors shifted their capital—including 
capital from other industrialized countries—en masse to the 
United States during the crisis. In that case, we would expect a 
real dollar appreciation against the currencies of other 
industrialized countries. Real exchange rates versus the dollar 
and the yen are presented in Chart 11.13 The dollar did 
appreciate against the yen, but the appreciation was short-lived 
and, by the end of 1998, the dollar’s yen value had fallen to pre-
Asia crisis levels. The euro/dollar rate was fairly stable during 
the first five quarters after the crisis. This evidence suggests that 
there was not a significant safe-haven effect in response to the 
Asia crisis. It is also consistent with our earlier evidence 
indicating that both the United States and Europe experienced 
large capital inflows connected to the crisis.
Did U.S. GDP Increase?
Having documented, to the extent possible, capital flows from 
Asia and into the United States, we turn to the consequences of 
those flows for the U.S. economy. As we noted earlier, there are 
at least three important channels through which the crisis in 
the Asian emerging markets could have affected U.S. GDP: 
• the net export demand channel (negative),
• the domestic demand channel (positive),
• the supply channel (positive).
The three effects are interrelated because the total demand 
for U.S. goods (net exports plus domestic demand) must equal 
supply. Appendix 2 presents two simple models that include 
these three channels. One is a partial-equilibrium model of the 
United States, the other is a two-country model of the United 
States and Asia. We briefly describe the intuition behind these 
models. Assume for simplicity that the world consists of two 
countries: the United States and Asia, with investors holding 
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Source: See Appendix 1.
Notes: The real exchange rate is the GDP deflator of Asian countries
relative to the U.S. GDP deflator, both in U.S. dollars. GDP weights
are 1994-96 average GDP shares.
Eve of crisis
of private sector bankruptcies, a sharp local currency depre-
ciation, and/or a stock market collapse cause them to shift their 
capital from Asia to the United States. These expectations could 
be driven by deteriorating fundamentals in Asia or they could 
be self-fulfilling and not based on fundamentals at all. Either 
way, the changed expectations lead to a fall in desired holdings 
of Asian assets.14
The capital outflows from Asia lead to a depreciation of 
Asian currencies—that is, an appreciation of the dollar. Asia’s 
output declines because there is less financing of its economic 
activity. Both the dollar appreciation and the decline in Asian 
output lead to lower U.S. net exports. At the same time, the 
capital inflow to the United States lowers U.S. interest rates, 
which leads to an increase in U.S. domestic demand by 
stimulating consumption and investment.15 In equilibrium, 
the total effect on demand for U.S. goods (the sum of lower net 
exports and higher domestic demand) is equal to the effect on 
the supply of those goods. The dollar appreciation leads to 
lower prices of imported inputs, which increases output supply 
in a manner analogous to the way an increase in productivity 
raises supply. Because the effect on output supply is positive, 
the total effect on demand is also positive.
Our interpretation of the crisis differs from the standard 
scenarios because of the central role assigned to the (net) 
capital outflows. The outflows are what leads to the currency 
depreciation and recession in Asia. In the standard scenarios, 
the currency depreciation and recession occur first, and the net 
capital outflow is just the passive counterpart to the recession-
induced improvement in the current account surplus.
In our scenario, the declining future fundamentals or 
nonfundamentals that give rise to the increased expectations of 
default, sharp currency depreciations, and/or stock market 
collapses have no effect other than their impact on desired net 
capital flows. It is possible that these declining forces could also 
have had a direct negative effect on current domestic demand 
in the Asian countries, independent of the decline in demand 
resulting from the cutoff of foreign inflows.16 When Asian 
domestic demand declines in this way, we show in Appendix 2 
that our findings of reduced output in Asia, higher output in 
the United States, a dollar appreciation, and lower U.S. interest 
rates are reinforced. This additional transmission channel, in 
other words, does not overturn the implications of our basic 
scenario. However, we also show that the decline in Asian 
domestic demand leads Asian real interest rates to fall relative 
to U.S. real interest rates, a finding that is inconsistent with the 
evidence. We therefore conclude that our basic “capital flow” 
scenario, which implies a rise in Asian interest rates, is more 
empirically relevant.
Evidence on the Three Channels
We now examine several macroeconomic indicators that 
provide evidence on the three channels. Together, Charts 12-18 
show that the evidence is broadly in line with the models.
The negative trade (net exports) channel is illustrated in 
Charts 12 and 13. Chart 12 presents the real exchange rate of 
the dollar against a GDP-weighted average of the Asia-4. We 
use GDP deflators as proxies for the price levels. The chart 
shows a 40 percent real appreciation of the dollar from 1997:2 
to 1998:1. Together with the immediate and sharp recession in 
the Asia-4 following the crisis, the appreciation led to a large 
drop in net exports to the Asia-4 economies. Chart 13 shows 
that U.S. merchandise net exports to the Asia-4 fell from about 
$3 billion per quarter before the crisis to -$6 billion per quarter 
soon after it. Summing over the four quarters preceding the 
crisis (1996:3-1997:2) and over 1998, we find that net exports 
fell by about $30 billion after the onset of the crisis. For a 
broader group of “Asia-8” countries—which also includes 
mainland China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore—U.S. 
Our interpretation of the crisis differs 
from the standard scenarios because 
of the central role assigned to the (net) 
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net merchandise exports fell by $46 billion after the crisis. 
Chart 13 also shows that the United States was not alone in the 
export decline: net exports from Japan and Europe to the 
Asia-4 also fell sharply following the crisis.
Evidence of the second channel’s importance can be found 
in Charts 14-16. Chart 14 shows that real interest rates declined 
considerably after the crisis.17 The ten-year real government 
bond yield fell by close to 100 basis points from 1997:2 to 
1998:1. The thirty-year mortgage yield and Moody’s Aaa 
Seasoned Corporate Bond Yield fell by similar magnitudes. 
Interest rates slid even further toward the end of 1998, and the 
nominal thirty-year mortgage yield reached its lowest level in 
thirty years. This drop in mortgage rates led to a sharp increase 
in mortgage refinancings (Chart 15). A significant share of the 
mortgages refinanced during 1998 involved cash-outs, which 
increased the overall size of the mortgages.
Our framework implies that we would expect to see a drop 
in the contribution to GDP growth coming from net exports 
(the first channel) while we would expect to see a rise in the 
contribution from domestic demand. Chart 16 indicates that 
this is exactly what occurred. Although the GDP growth rate of 
4 percent in 1998 remained virtually unchanged from the 1997 
growth rate, the contribution from domestic demand rose 
from about 4 percent precrisis to about 5 percent postcrisis. At 
the same time, the contribution from net exports went from 
being slightly negative to about -1 percent. Europe responded 
to the crisis similarly to the United States, as we see from 
Chart 17. Here, we have separated the United Kingdom from FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2000 61
Chart 17
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Eve of crisis
From Asia-8
the Europe-6. The United Kingdom is a special case because 
significant fiscal consolidation and a tightening of monetary 
conditions dampened domestic demand growth. In the 
Europe-6, we see that the contribution of domestic demand 
growth rose from about 1 percent precrisis to a level between 
2 and 3 percent postcrisis. At the same time, the contribution 
of net exports to GDP growth went from slightly below 
1 percent to slightly above -1 percent.
The third channel depends on both the change in the 
relative price of imports (the reciprocal of the real exchange 
rate) and on the elasticity of supply with respect to the relative 
price of imports. Here, we provide evidence on the relative 
price of imports; in the next section, we derive the elasticity of 
supply. The import price index for total imports as well as for 
merchandise imports from the Asia-4 and the Asia-8 appears in 
Chart 18.18 All import price indexes are shown relative to the 
U.S. GDP deflator, and all are indexed to 100 in 1997:2. The 
Asia-8 index represents a broader view of the impact of the Asia 
crisis on U.S. import prices. The import price indexes show 
a sharp decrease for both sets of countries: from the precrisis 
period of 1996:3-1997:2 to 1998, the relative import price index 
dropped by 18 percent for the Asia-4 and by 12 percent for the 
Asia-8.19
Quantifying the Three Channels
We now quantify the effect on GDP growth of each of the three 
channels. By doing so, we impose only minimal assumptions, 
in contrast to the strong structure imposed by the models in 
Appendix 2. We consider both the Asia-4 countries and the 
broader set of Asia-8 countries. By looking at the Asia-8, we can 
account for spillovers from the crisis to some important 
neighboring countries. However, we do not consider indirect 
supply channels operating through oil or commodity prices. 
The recessions in the Asia-8 countries clearly had some 
negative effect on oil prices in 1998. These indirect channels 
would tend to raise the estimates of our supply channel effect.
We define the pre- and postcrisis periods as we did earlier: 
1996:3-1997:2 and 1998:1-1998:4, respectively. It is not 
appropriate simply to compare 1997 with 1998 because the 
crisis had already started in 1997. It is also not appropriate to 
compare the four quarters before the crisis with the four 
quarters following the start of the crisis—1996:3-1997:2 and 
1997:3-1998:2, respectively—because the crisis did not take 
The import price indexes show a sharp 
decrease for both sets of countries: . . . the 
relative import price index dropped by 
18 percent for the Asia-4 [countries] and 
by 12 percent for the Asia-8 [countries].62 Asia Crisis Postmortem
effect fully until 1998. As shown in Chart 13, it took two or 
three quarters for U.S. and Europe-7 net exports to decline to 
their lower postcrisis levels. Also, as we noted, the effect of the 
capital outflows on the current account of the Asian countries 
was initially buffered by IMF credit and a drop in reserve assets. 
The full adjustment in the current account did not occur until 
1998:1.
We compute the trade effect without making any model-
specific assumptions. We do not need to know the exact causes 
of the decline in net exports to the Asia crisis countries. Rather, 
we employ bilateral trade data to calculate how much the 
contribution of net exports to U.S. GDP growth fell as a result 
of the crisis. We focus on merchandise trade because it 
accounted for 79 percent of total U.S. trade in 1998; it is also 
considerably more volatile than services trade. The contribution 
to real GDP growth of net exports can be written as 
(1)                        
                ,
where Y is nominal GDP,   and   are import and export 
price indexes vis-à-vis the Asian countries, and X and M are 
quantities of bilateral exports and imports. The first term on 
the lower part of the equation measures the change in the 
nominal trade balance relative to GDP. The second term 
measures the price effects. The price effects are subtracted from 
the nominal trade effect to get the overall real trade effect. We 
approximate the U.S. export price index to the Asian countries 
by the overall U.S. export price index. The import price index 
is approximated by using an import-weighted index of the 
Asian country export price indexes.
Supply is determined by the production of firms, which are 
assumed to maximize profits by choosing optimal levels of 
labor input and imported intermediate goods. This approach 
ensures that output is not determined only by demand. To 
facilitate our calculations of the supply effect, we make two 
auxiliary assumptions. First, we hold the capital stock constant. 
This assumption is not restrictive, because it merely reflects the 
fact that our analysis focuses on the short-term effects. Second, 
we assume that the real wage rate is constant. This assumption 
implies that the labor supply schedule is perfectly elastic. We 
argue below that this assumption is not essential to our main 
findings. As long as the labor supply schedule is not perfectly 
inelastic, we will obtain qualitatively similar results.
The details of the firms’ profit-maximization problem that 
underlies our calculation are presented in the box. Firms 
maximize the difference between revenues (the value of 
output) and costs. The variable costs are labor costs and the 






























aggregate the entire domestic production process; hence, we do 
not include domestic intermediate goods. Our goal is to 
quantify the effect of a decrease in imported input prices on 
supply.
After computing the first-order conditions for imported 
inputs and labor, the supply effect can be written as 
(2)               ,
where   is the share of imported inputs in total production 
costs in the precrisis period and   is the share of labor income 
in domestic valued-added.   is the price of imported 
inputs relative to the price of output. Real GDP is equal to the 
total value of domestic output, minus imported inputs, 
measured at precrisis price levels. Notice that the supply effect 
is independent of the elasticity of substitution between 
imported inputs and domestic value-added. Notice also that as 
long as import prices fall, the supply effect is positive.20
We compute the change in the overall   as the 
merchandise import share from the Asia-4 or the Asia-8 
multiplied by the percentage change of   for the Asia-4 or 
the Asia-8. In the Asia-8 case, the change in the overall   
is about -2.3 percent.21 The labor income share of GDP in 1997 
was 58 percent, so we set   equal to 0.58. We set   equal to 
U.S. imports of intermediate and capital goods in 1998 (about 
60 percent of total merchandise imports) divided by the sum 


























K = capital = constant
M = imported intermediates and imported capital goods
P = price of gross output
W = nominal wage rate (W/P assumed constant)
 = price of imported inputs
 = F ( (K,L), M) (production function)
(K,L) = Cobb-Douglas index of K and L (labor share =  )
F(., .) = CES index with elasticity of substitution  .
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Although the net effect can be computed from the supply 
effect alone, it is still useful to know how the demand side 
breaks out into the net exports effect and domestic demand 
effect. We estimate the domestic demand effect as the 
residual—that is, we compute the effect as the difference 
between the supply effect and the net exports effect. It would be 
difficult to calculate the domestic demand effect directly. For 
example, we would have to know the size of the increase in 
capital flows to the United States that can be traced to the crisis, 
the effect of these inflows on the interest rate, and the elasticity 
of investment demand and savings demand with respect to the 
interest rate. To know the savings demand and investment 
demand elasticities, we would require a model of consumption 
behavior and of investment behavior, with the corresponding 
set of assumptions. Therefore, by treating the domestic 
demand effect as the residual, we avoid making the large 
number of assumptions necessary to calculate it.
The results of these computations are reported in Table 2. 
If we interpret the Asia crisis broadly as corresponding to 
developments in the Asia-8 countries, U.S. GDP fell by 
0.8 percentage point as a result of a drop in net exports to those 
countries, while it rose by 1.0 percentage point as a result of the 
increase in domestic demand. The net effect, which is also the 
supply effect, is +0.2 percentage point of GDP. The numbers 
are slightly smaller for the Asia-4. Our supply effect calcu-
lations suggest that the net effect of the Asia crisis is small, but 
positive.
These results do not change in a major way if labor supply is 
not perfectly elastic. In this case, the increased demand for 
labor (which results from lower prices of imported goods) 
leads to a rise in real wages. In the extreme case where labor 
supply is completely inelastic, the supply effect is zero. 
Although the lower prices of imported inputs lead to an 
increase in demand for the inputs, which raises gross output, 
domestic value-added remains unaltered because both the 
capital stock and labor input are unchanged. In general, when 
labor supply’s elasticity is finite, the supply effect will be 
somewhere between 0 percent and 0.2 percent.22
Our findings correspond well with Chart 16, which shows 
that real GDP growth remained virtually unchanged following 
the crisis. The negative effect from lower net exports was 
almost exactly offset by the rise in domestic demand. The 
increase in the contribution of domestic demand to GDP 
growth from the pre- to the postcrisis period was about 
1 percent. Hence, while mindful of the fact that we have 
calculated the domestic demand effect as a residual, we suggest 
that the Asia crisis could have accounted for all of the increase 
in U.S. domestic demand.
There are other explanations for the increase in U.S. 
domestic demand during the crisis. However, to the extent that 
these explanations involve developments specific to the United 
States, such as the rise in the U.S. stock market, we believe that 
they are not very plausible.23 If, for whatever reason, there is a 
substantial increase in domestic demand specific to the United 
States, we would have expected to see a rise in U.S. real interest 
rates and a real dollar appreciation relative to other major 
currencies. We have seen neither of these developments. Real 
interest rates actually fell rather than rose. Moreover, we saw 
that the increase in the contribution of domestic demand to 
GDP growth in Europe was similar in magnitude to that for the 
United States.
It is possible that a worldwide event, such as the improved 
growth outlook, led to a rise in domestic demand on both sides 
of the Atlantic at the same time. This possibility also seems 
dubious, because the growth forecasts fell in Europe and in the 
United States after the crisis. The fact that the pickup in 
domestic demand took place soon after the crisis—and that it 
occurred both in Europe and in the United States—is highly 
suggestive of a causal link to the crisis.
Table 2
The Growth Effect of the Asia Crisis
Percent
Asia-4 Asia-8
Trade effect -0.5 -0.8
Domestic demand effect 0.6 1.0
  Total effect 0.1 0.2
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: The table reports the contribution to GDP growth of lower trade 
and higher domestic demand as a result of the Asia crisis, as well as the 
total effect on GDP growth (which is also the supply effect). Results are 
reported based on one associating the Asia crisis narrowly with four 
countries: Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand, as well as 
with a broader set of eight countries that also includes mainland China, 
Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore. 
The fact that the pickup in domestic 
demand took place soon after the crisis—
and that it occurred both in Europe and in 
the United States—is highly suggestive 
of a causal link to the crisis.64 Asia Crisis Postmortem
Conclusion
In the 1990s, many emerging market countries facilitated 
foreign investor access to their financial markets by liberalizing 
controls on international capital flows. This action has been 
beneficial for the emerging markets as well as for investors from 
industrialized countries. However, because capital inflows can 
easily be reversed in a short period of time, there have also been 
risks associated with the increased exposure of foreign 
investors to these new markets. To date, much of the literature 
on the Asia crisis has focused on assessing the causes and 
consequences for the crisis countries. In this article, we have 
shifted the focus by examining the implications for 
industrialized countries—and for the United States in 
particular—of such economic turmoil.
Although the negative trade effects for industrialized 
economies were emphasized early in the crisis, it soon became 
clear that the trade channel was not the only transmission 
channel. By definition, a capital outflow from Asia is a capital 
inflow somewhere else. Capital inflows can finance an increase 
in domestic demand, which leads to an increase in GDP. One 
goal of this article, therefore, was to follow the trail of money 
out of Asia to ascertain its final destination. We have found it 
difficult to follow the trail very far, and to determine exactly 
how much of the funds ended up in the United States. We have 
also found that large errors and omissions in the U.S. balance 
of payments complicate the documentation of capital inflows 
to the United States.
Nevertheless, several stylized facts have emerged:
• The Asia crisis countries experienced net capital 
outflows of more than $80 billion from the start of the 
crisis to the end of 1998.
• The counterparties to the Asia outflows essentially were 
BIS reporting country banks.
• The majority of the outflows went to offshore center 
banks, which funneled the capital to banks in Europe.
• Almost half of the outflows went to banks whose 
nationalities were not American, Japanese, or European.
• The United States and Europe were the final destinations 
for most of the outflows from the crisis countries and 
from Japan.
• Very little money reached the United States directly from 
the crisis countries or through the offshore centers. 
These facts highlight the importance of banks as the initial 
propagation mechanisms of the Asia crisis as well as the 
“roundaboutness” of the banking flows.
A second goal of this article was to analyze and quantify the 
short-run effect of the crisis on U.S. GDP growth. We 
identified three channels through which U.S. growth was 
affected. In the first channel, the recessions in the Asian 
countries and the depreciated Asian currencies imply fewer 
U.S. exports and more U.S. imports. In the second, the lower 
U.S. interest rates that result from the increased inflows imply 
greater domestic demand. And in the third, dollar appreciation 
implies lower prices for imported intermediates and imported 
capital goods, which reduces the cost of production. In 
equilibrium, the sum of the first two demand channels equals 
the third: the supply channel. Our calculations suggest that the 
negative trade response is -0.8 percent of GDP, while the 
positive supply response is +0.2 percent of GDP. The domestic 
demand response, which we calculate as a residual, is about 
+1 percent of GDP. The overall effect on the U.S. economy in 
1998, therefore, is about +0.2 percent of GDP, or $15 billion 
to $20 billion. 
Going forward, we can expect these effects to move in the 
opposite direction as the Asian economies recover. If our 
findings are correct, however, a reversal of capital flows to the 
Asian countries will generate only a small net effect on U.S. 
growth. Yet such a reversal could still generate large 
compositional effects on domestic demand and net exports.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2000 65
Charts
Chart 1: Sum across Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines (henceforth the “Asia-4”) of the financial account 
as reported by the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. IFS had not 
yet reported the Korean financial account for 1998:4, so we use 
McGraw-Hill’s DRI Asia CEIC database. 
Chart 2: Sum across Asia-4 of portfolio investment (liabilities 
- assets), direct investment abroad - direct investment in the 
reporting economy, and other investment (liabilities - assets), 
respectively, reported in IFS. Because of missing 1998:4 Korean 
data, the CEIC database is used to complete the direct invest-
ment, portfolio investment, and other investment series.
Chart 3: Exchange-rate-adjusted flows and assets - liabilities 
(including nonbank) are from the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS). The “vis-à-vis” area is Asia-4; the reporting 
area is the “grand total” of BIS reporting countries.
Chart 4: Exchange-rate-adjusted flows and assets - liabilities 
(including nonbank) are from the BIS. The “vis-à-vis” area is 
Asia-4; the reporting areas are Japan, the offshore centers, and 
the United States and international banking facilities (IBFs), as 
well as France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (henceforth the 
“Europe-7”).
Chart 5: The top panel is the stock of total assets vis-à-vis 
Asia-4, with the geographic origin of a bank being the reporting 
area. The BIS is the source. The bottom panel is also the stock 
of total assets vis-à-vis Asia-4, but by nationality of ownership. 
The BIS’ Consolidated International Banking Statistics is the 
source. Because of data unavailability, we exclude Switzerland 
from the Europe series in the bottom panel.
Chart 6: The financial account series is the same as in Chart 1. 
Other series: sum across Asia-4 of “reserves and related items” 
and the current account as reported by International Financial 
Statistics. IFS had not yet reported the Korean financial or 
current account for 1998:4, so we use the Bank of Korea’s 
External Economic Indicators Table P.F.2b for Korean current 
account data. For changes in reserve assets, we use the CEIC 
database for Korea for 1998:4.
Chart 7: With some exceptions in the most recent quarters, 
current account balance data for France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom are 
from the BIS; Italian data are from Banca d’Italia; Indonesian, 
Japanese, Korean, Philippine, Thai, and U.S. data are from IFS. 
The exceptions are the Spanish current account for 1999:1, 
which is from Bloomberg, and Korean data for 1998:4 and 
1999:1, which are from J. P. Morgan International Data Watch, 
as is the Indonesian value for 1999:1. Data from the BIS are 
converted to U.S. dollars using period-average exchange rates. 
All series are seasonally adjusted using the X11 additive filter in 
Eviews 3.0.
Chart 8: The net bank lending series is the same as in Chart 4. 
The net portfolio flows series is derived from Treasury 
International Capital data. Long-term net sales by foreigners to 
U.S. residents is calculated from the TIC’s U.S. Transactions 
with Foreigners in Long-Term Securities Table. Short-term 
Treasury obligations from the TIC’s Liabilities to Foreigners 
Reported by Banks in the U.S. Table are also included. 
Quarterly data are calculated using monthly sums.
Chart 9: These data are exchange-rate-adjusted flows, assets - 
liabilities (including nonbank), as reported by the BIS. The top 
panel is the United States and IBFs reporting vis-à-vis all BIS 
reporting countries; the bottom panel is the United States and 
IBFs reporting vis-à-vis Japan, the offshore centers, and 
Europe-7.
Chart 10: The U.S. financial account, current account, and net 
errors and omissions are from IFS.
Chart 11: Monthly averages of the daily BIS nominal exchange 
rate series for Europe and Japan are multiplied by the ratio of 
the U.S. and European consumer price indexes (CPIs) and the 
ratio of the U.S. and Japanese CPIs, respectively. The U.S. CPI 
is from Haver Analytics’ USECON database. The European 
and Japanese CPIs are from the BIS. All CPIs are indexed to 
1995=100.
Chart 12: Quarterly average exchange rates for the Asia-4 are 
from IFS. GDP deflators are calculated using nominal and real 
GDP series from the CEIC database. After indexing all series to 
1997:2=100, we use a GDP-weighted (1994-96 average GDP 
shares) average of the real exchange rates to yield the Asia-4/
U.S. real exchange rate.
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Chart 13: Data are from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics 
database. Asia-4 countries are the primary countries—that is, 
they report data on exports and imports—while secondary coun- 
tries are the world, the United States, Japan, and Europe-7. To 
construct each series, we sum the quantity (net exports * -1) 
across the Asia-4 countries and across Europe-7.
Chart 14: Ten-year government bond yields are from the 
European Central Bank’s Euro Area Statistics Monthly Data 
Table 3.2 and its web site (http://www.ecb.int/stats/mb/
eastats.htm). The Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond 
Yield series and thirty-year mortgage rate series (“Contract 
Rates on Commitments: Conventional Thirty-Year Mortgages, 
FHLMC (percent)”) are both from USECON. All interest rates 
are quarterly averages of daily rates minus the Q/Q-4 growth 
rate of the CPI, excluding food and energy. The CPI series is 
from USECON. 
Chart 15: This series is the refinancing index from the 
Mortgage Bankers Association’s weekly survey. Data are 
seasonally adjusted, and weekly observations have been 
converted to monthly averages.
Chart 16: All data are from USECON. Contribution of 
domestic demand = [nominal DD(Q-4)/nominal 
GDP(Q-4)]*real DD growth Q/Q-4. Nominal domestic 
demand is the sum of the C, I, and G (consumption, 
investment, and government) series. Real domestic demand is 
the sum of the CH, IH, and GH (1992 chain-weighted dollars 
of the C, I, and G series) series. Nominal GDP is simply the 
series GDP. The real GDP growth series is GDPH (seasonally 
adjusted, 1992 chain-weighted dollars). The contribution of 
net exports series is the difference between real GDP growth 
and contribution of domestic demand.
Chart 17: For the top panel, contribution of domestic demand 
= (sum nominal domestic demand(Q-4) across Europe-6/sum 
nominal GDP(Q-4) across Europe-6)*(Europe-6 real domestic 
demand growth (Q/Q-4)).
In the above formula, the nominal domestic demand and 
nominal GDP series are from the BIS, where nominal domestic 
demand is reported in the local currency and nominal GDP is 
reported in dollars. Nominal domestic demand is converted to 
dollars (for the purpose of summing) using the period-average 
quarterly exchange rates from IFS. Real domestic demand 
growth for the individual Europe-6 countries of France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland is 
from the BIS. The BIS had not yet reported Italy’s 1998:4 real 
domestic demand growth, so we use Bloomberg (the original 
source is ISTAT). Europe-6 real domestic demand growth for 
each quarter is constructed as the weighted average (a country’s 
weight is its nominal domestic demand four quarters ago) of 
the individual countries’ real (Q/Q-4) domestic demand 
growth rates.
Europe-6 real GDP growth is calculated as the weighted 
average (a country’s weight is its nominal GDP four quarters 
ago) of the individual countries’ real (Q/Q-4) GDP growth 
rates. The nominal GDP data used in the weighting are the 
same as those used in the construction of contribution of 
domestic demand (see above). The individual countries’ real 
GDP data are from the BIS.
For the bottom panel, the United Kingdom’s contribution 
of domestic demand = [nominal DD(Q-4)/nominal 
GDP(Q-4)]*real DD growth Q/Q-4. In the above formula, the 
nominal domestic demand and nominal GDP series are from 
the BIS, where nominal domestic demand is reported in British 
pounds and nominal GDP is in U.S. dollars. Nominal domestic 
demand is converted to dollars (for the purpose of summing) 
using IFS quarterly period-average exchange rates. Real 
domestic demand growth and U.K. real GDP growth are from 
the BIS.
In both panels, contribution of the net exports series is the 
difference between real GDP growth and contribution of 
domestic demand.
Chart 18: U.S. import price indexes from the Asian countries 
are approximated using export price indexes of the Asian 
countries (from Oxford Economics) in dollar terms. Indexes 
are deflated using the U.S. GDP deflator. After we calculate real 
import price indexes for the eight Asian countries, 1995 U.S. 
import shares yield weighted averages for Asia-4 and Asia-8.
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Two Models
Here we present two models that deliver the implications 
discussed in the text. The first is a partial-equilibrium model 
for the United States, the second is a two-country general-
equilibrium model for the United States and Asia. The first has 
a goods-market equilibrium condition and a balance-of-
payments equilibrium condition: 
(A1)           ,
(A2)           .
Y ( ) is output supply. It is a positive function of the real 
exchange rate: a real appreciation (a rise in RER) lowers the 
relative price of imported goods, which stimulates production. 
On the right-hand side of the goods-market equilibrium 
equation (A1) is total demand for U.S. goods, which is the sum 
of domestic demand (DD) and net exports (NX). Domestic 
demand is a positive function of income Y and a negative 
function of the real interest rate r. Net exports fall in response 
to both a real appreciation and a rise in domestic income, 
which raises imports.
 The second equation (A2) represents balance-of-payments 
equilibrium: the sum of net exports and net capital inflows 
(KA) must be zero. A rise in the real interest rate raises capital 
inflows. Capital flows also depend on the shift parameter,  , 
which represents a desire by investors to reallocate their capital 
to the United States based on concerns of increased risks of 
default in Asia as well as increased probabilities of currency 
depreciations and stock market collapses. In our framework, it 
does not matter whether these concerns are based on 
fundamentals, are rational self-fulfilling beliefs, or are 
irrational altogether. 
It is easily verifiable from these two equations that an 
increase in  , which leads to a shift of capital to the United 
YR E R () DD r Y , () NX RER Y , () + =
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States, implies a real dollar appreciation, a drop in the real 
interest rate, and a rise in output.
The second model extends the first to a general-equilibrium 
model for the United States and Asia: 
(A3)           ,
(A4)           ,
(A5)           .
Asia is indicated by  . This model adds a goods-market 
equilibrium condition for Asia and makes U.S. net exports also 
a function of income in Asia. Moreover, net capital flows now 
depend on the interest rate differential. It is easily verifiable that 
an increase in   has the same implications for the United States 
as in the first model. Now the model also has implications for 
the Asian economy: its real interest rate rises and its output 
falls.24
We can extend the two-country model to include a shift 
parameter,  , in the Asia domestic demand function. A 
decrease in   corresponds to a decrease in government 
purchases or to a decrease in consumption or investment 
demand resulting from, say, increased pessimism about future 
macroeconomic prospects.   captures the idea that other forces 
could lead to a reallocation of capital from Asia to the United 
States independent of changes in  . It is easily verifiable that a 
decrease in   has the same implications for the United States: a 
lower interest rate, a real dollar appreciation, and a rise in 
output. These implications, therefore, reinforce the effect of a 
rise in  . We believe that the latter effect likely was more 
important in the Asia crisis, because a rise in   leads to higher 
Asian interest rates, consistent with the evidence, while a fall in 
 results in the opposite.
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1. A reasonable consensus was reported in the New York Times: “Many 
forecasters estimate that the Asian crisis will in time shave half a 
percentage point from the nation’s economic growth” (January 30, 
1998). For example, between September and November, J. P. Morgan 
revised its forecast of the net export contribution to GDP growth in 
1998 from -0.1 percentage point to -0.6 percentage point. Most 
forecasts of the impact of the crisis were based only on international 
trade channels.
2. We therefore believe that the demand-oriented Mundell-Fleming 
type of model is not sufficient for considering the implications of the 
crisis.
3. The first hints that market forecasters were aware of the positive 
effects of the crisis through lower interest rates came as early as 
January 1998. See, for example, J. P. Morgan’s “U.S. Economic 
Outlook” (January 16) or New York Times (January 30). 
In addition, Jeffrey Frankel, then at the Council of Economic 
Advisors, indicated in a November 17, 1999, speech at the Institute of 
International Finance that the negative effect of the crisis through 
trade could be mitigated “if one takes into account that the likely effect 
would be interest rates lower than they otherwise would be, thereby 
replacing demand lost in the trade sector with output in producers’ 
durable equipment, construction, and consumer durables.” However, 
Frankel also pointed out that at the time “many of the estimates of the 
East Asian crisis are just the effect on U.S. net exports.” Even analysts 
who understood the positive effects through lower interest rates 
generally still considered the overall effects of the crisis to be negative. 
Only as 1998 proceeded did it become increasingly clear that the U.S. 
economy did not suffer a negative hit from the crisis in Asia.
4. Related research includes Ito (1999), Bonti et al. (1999), and 
Fornari and Levy (1999). These studies, however, tend to focus on the 
flows/stocks of financial assets into or out of emerging Asia. None of 
them attempts to trace the flow of capital from emerging Asia to the 
United States during the recent currency crisis.
5. Although Malaysia is often included as one of the crisis countries, 
we do not include it in our main calculations because of incomplete 
data, particularly in terms of the breakdown of the financial account 
into portfolio investment, foreign direct investment, and other 
investment.  For 1998, however, we know that Malaysia experienced at 
least a $5 billion net outflow of short-term capital alone. We include 
Malaysia in a broader set of eight Asian countries when we consider 
the effect of the crisis on U.S. growth.
6. Direct investment refers to international flows of “equity capital, 
reinvested earnings, and other capital associated with various 
intercompany transactions between affiliated enterprises” 
(International Monetary Fund 1999). It generally refers to greenfield 
investment and to mergers and acquisitions. Portfolio investment 
refers to international flows of equity (except equity counted as direct 
investment) and debt securities of any maturity. “Other” investment 
involves bank and nonbank intermediaries on either side of the 
transaction.
7. The offshore centers include the Bahamas, Bahrain, the Cayman 
Islands, Hong Kong, the Netherlands Antilles, and Singapore.
8. The only difference of note is that in 1998:1 the extent of the capital 
outflow from the Asia-4 was less than it was in the previous quarter, 
while the reduction in net lending by BIS reporting banks was slightly 
larger.
9. In other words, we assume that these countries typically have small 
current accounts and small net changes in central bank reserves. This 
is a reasonable assumption for all of the offshore centers except Hong 
Kong and Singapore. Total net cumulative external lending of the 
offshore centers was $29 billion during this period. However, this 
amount is a relatively small fraction of the gross flows in and out of the 
centers. By contrast, during the crisis, the gross flows of the Asia crisis 
countries were similar in magnitude to the net flows.
10. Data for Switzerland were not available.
11. Applying a linear trend to Japan as well, we find that the country’s 
current account surplus increased by $12 billion relative to trend in 
this period. This increase is less than one-half of the increase in the 
Asia-4 and Malaysian current accounts. Hence, it seems clear that 
most of the decrease in the Europe-7 and U.S. current accounts can be 
attributed to the emerging market crisis in Asia.
12. This figure assumes that all the errors occur because of misre-
porting of the capital account data. In other words, we assume that the 
current account data are represented accurately.
13. Real exchange rates are normalized to equal nominal exchange 
rates for the average of 1995.
14. See, for example, Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1999) for a 
“fundamentals”-based explanation of the Asia crisis and Radelet and Endnotes (Continued)
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Sachs (1998) for a self-fulfilling-expectations explanation. In our 
framework, it does not matter for the U.S. economy whether or not 
the expectations are driven by fundamentals. However, the source of 
the changed expectations does matter, of course, for the Asian 
countries, particularly from a policy standpoint.
15. Empirical documentation of the textbook linkages from lower 
interest rates to higher consumption and investment is not 
widespread. Campbell and Mankiw (1989), for example, conclude 
that there is virtually no link between real interest rates and 
consumption. However, evidence of such linkages does exist. See 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990) for evidence that ties interest rates to 
investment. See Mankiw (1985) and Beaudry and van Wincoop 
(1996) for evidence that ties interest rates to consumption.
16. An expected drop in future income could similarly lower 
consumption.
17. We subtract the Q/Q-4 core inflation rate from nominal interest 
rates as a proxy for inflation expectations. Core inflation rates are 
considered a good indicator of long-term inflation trends. Inflation 
survey data are available only up to one year ahead.
18. We have proxied the U.S. import price index from each Asian 
country by each country’s overall export price index, expressed in 
U.S. dollars.
19. These figures are consistent with those reported in Barth and 
Dinmore (1999).
20. It therefore might seem that we have “rigged” our approach to 
guarantee a positive net impact of the crisis on the United States. This 
assumption is incorrect for several reasons. First, it is possible 
(although not probable) that the crisis in Asia could have led to higher 
U.S. import prices, to the extent that financing difficulties severely 
disrupted Asian production. If higher prices induced by lower 
production more than offset the effects of exchange rate depreciation, 
U.S. import prices could have risen. Second, it is hard to see how lower 
import prices could have a negative effect on supply, just as it is hard 
to see how lower oil prices or higher productivity would lower supply. 
Third, as discussed below, our estimates of the supply effect and the 
net exports effect imply a domestic demand effect that is consistent 
with what is observed in the data.
21. We approximate P with the GDP deflator, as in Chart 12. This is 
not exactly correct, because P is the price of value-added plus 
imported inputs, not just value-added. But it is a close approximation, 
as is  quite  small.
22. As noted earlier, we abstract from indirect supply effects, such as 
those resulting from oil prices. If the decline in oil prices in 1998 is 
entirely attributable to declining demand in the Asia-8 countries, then 
the supply effect would be considerably larger, close to 1 percentage 
point of GDP. In addition, as noted earlier, supply also could have 
been affected through the profits channel. Although corporate profits 
rose somewhat following the crisis, it is hard to say how much this rise 
could have affected the supply effect.
23. Although European stock markets appreciated as well, these 
markets are much smaller in scale—in total and in per capita—than 
the U.S. stock markets.
24. This model is very similar to the flexible-price model in Abel and 
Bernanke (1995). One difference is that we include an additional 
supply-side channel from imported inputs to output.
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